The vicious/virtuous circle debate in the twenties and the seventies by DE CECCO, Marcello
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No. 24
THE VICIOUS/VIRTUOUS CIRCLE DEBATE 
IN THE TWENTIES AND THE SEVENTIES
by
Marcello de Cecco 
January 1983
Paper presented at the Conference "Inflation and Recon­
struction in Germany and Europe 1914-1924" held at the 
University of California, Berkeley, in July 1982.
320
EUIG20650




























































































No part of this paper may be 
reproduced in any form without 
permission of the author.
(C) Marcello de Cecco 
Printed in Italy in January 1983 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate
in the Twenties and the Seventies
It is easy, almost natural for an Italian, to be a sup­
porter of Giovanbattista Vico's cyclical theory of history. 
To a people exposed to several thousand years of historical 
events, the temptation of seeing history as a series of 
"corsi e ricorsi" is too great to be always successfully re­
sisted.
But an equally strong temptation exists for the econo­
mist to subscribe to an adaptation of Vico's method when he 
is confronted with some of the most recent developments in 
the field of international economics. I have fallen easy 
prey to the temptation and I will dedicate this essay to a 
particular instance of "history repeats itself— the vicious/ 
virtuous circle debate".
After the monetary earthquake of August 1971, the 
Kippur War, and the two oil-price explosions, economists of • 
all persuasions devoted themselves to the construction of a 
so-called "vicious-virtuous circle hypothesis", while other 
economists negated the plausibility of the same hypothesis.
The point of the present essay is that, in the course)of this, interesting debate, only one or two of the partici­
pants showed any knowledge of the fact that the same debate, 
using almost the same arguments, had been conducted in the 
early- nineteen twenties, among economists who had observed 




























































































In the present essay I will, first of all, give a brief 
overview of the modern debate. I will then relate the main 
points of the old debate. The reader will be at the end 
able to see how the two overlap almost completely.
An overview of the modern debate
1, The recent debate on the vicious/virtuous circle hypoth­
esis started in the mid-seventies, primarily receiving 
attention from members of international organizations 
such as BIS, I.MF, and OECD, as well as from members of 
various central banks and Finance Ministries, Referenc­
es to this debate at the policy-making level can be 
found in BILSON (1778), HABERLER (1 977), and LEHMENT 
(1980). The following statements are often cited:
a) B. CLAPPIER (1978, p. 9); "A fall in the exchange 
rate in the market is reflected, even before the slight­
est impact is felt on export volume, in an immediate 
rise in the cost of imports. Thus, in the first phase, 
the external depreciation of the currency aggravates the 
internal inflation rate. These two phenomena follow and 
reinforce each other, setting in motion a cumulative 
process at the end of which the currency's exchange val­
ue continues to fall."
b.) BIS (1 976, p. 31): "According to one view-, the
8 I am indebted for the selection of quotations that appear 
in this part of the essay to Dr. Mathias Wolf, who was at­
tached as Fellow to the Research Programme of the Economics 




























































































greater monetary autonomy which countries enjoy under a 
floating régime implies that exchange rate movements 
will passively reflect the inflation rates which coun­
tries "choose" to maintain relative to inflation in 
other countries. While there is considerable truth in 
this view, experience has shown that the interrelation­
ships between inflation and floating rates are much 
more complex. The causal relations run in both direc­
tions and often tend to be self-reinforcing. This 
stems from the fact that movements in exchange rates 
may often be the result of changes in such, factors as 
confidence, expectations and the monetary/fiscal policy 
mix. Hence they can, through their influence on import 
and export prices, exert an independent effect on the 
rate of domestic price and wage inflation. The influence 
is particularly strong in open economies with large 
trading sectors and in economies where wages respond 
promptly to changes in the consumer price level".
2. The occurrence of vicious and virtuous circles was at­
tributed to clean floating and thus was used as a case 
against (purely) flexible exchange rates. At the po­
litical level, this position was used by several Euro­
pean central bankers, On the other hand, as WALLICH 
and GRAY (1979, p. 2) point out: "The position of the
U,S. Treasury at the time was strongly in favor of 
cleaner floating." But: "This policy debate has lost
some of its urgency as a result of the general trend 
toward more managed floating, that began, for the Unit­




























































































3. The proponents of the vicious and virtuous circle hypoth­
esis have developed a number of different explanations, 
which in turn have provoked various critical objections. 
To begin with, these explanations are presented below. 
This is followed by the presentation and discussion of 
the objections raised against these explanations.
4. The first explanation of the vicious and virtuous circle 
hypothesis to be considered here, has been emphasized by 
T.D, WILLETT (1977, p, 251f), although this author adopts 
in general a very critical approach towards this hypothe­
sis :
"Some proponents of the vicious circle hypothesis would 
presumably grant that to the extent that exchange-rate 
depreciations were the direct result of domestic infla­
tion, they could not legitimately* be labeled a cause of 
additional inflationary pressures. But such proponents 
would go on to argue that exchange-rate depreciations, 
frequently tend to be exaggerated because of destabiliz­
ing speculation or other shifts in capital flows and that 
it is these exaggerated depreciations that are the cause 
of additional inflationary pressures,"
5. Thus, for whatever initial rate of inflation, this argu­
ment says that speculation may provoke a larger deprecia­
tion of the currency than would be required according to 
the purchasing power parity rule. This part of the argu­
ment runs counter to the belief, widespread among econo­
mists at the beginning of the seventies, that exchange 
rate changes would merely reflect adaptations to infla­
tion rate differentials. Several authors, summarizing 
the experience of the recent floating period, have empha­




























































































P. KRUGMAN, 1976, p. 537f; A .D. CROCKETT and M. GOLDSTEIN, 
1976, p. 514).
6. The next step in this line of reasoning concerns the impact 
of a devaluation of the domestic currency on the domestic 
rate of inflation. R. DORNBUSCH and P. KRUGMAN (1976, p.
569) state: "Depreciation, particularly in medium-sized and 
small countries, has a strong, direct impact on inflation of 
wholesale and consumer prices. The main channels are (a) 
costs of importing materials, (b) wages, (c) import prices 
of finished goods, (d) aggregate demand, and (e) a direct 
spillover into prices of import-competing goods." Most 
authors acknowledge that this impact on inflation is the 
stronger, 1) the smaller the country, and 2) the more open 
the country. For an explanation see e.g. A. LAMFALUSSY 
(1979, p. 57): "'Small' countries are price takers; hence 
prices of internationally traded goods expressed in the 
national currency tend to increase, after a relatively 
short time lag, by the amount of the currency. This 
applies both to import and export prices."— "When a 'small' 
country is at the same time "open", there will be a high 
proportion of tradables or effectively traded goods in the 
domestic output. The price increase therefore directly 
affects a large proportion of the goods produced and consu­
med domestically."— Large countries, on the other hand, with 
a normally broader diversification of industry, can be expec­
ted to have more import-competing industries. Also, import­
ers may be expected to be more inclined to accept temporary 
reductions of profit margins in large markets than in small 
markets in order to maintain their market share.— The more 
closed the economy, the fewer imports are used as inputs by 




























































































goods, which enter into the calculation of the price index, 
hence the smaller is their impact on this index.
7. The final element of the destabilizing speculation argument 
concerns the continuation of the process. To the extent 
that this point is not explicitly dealt with, as is the 
case for example in the BIS annual report, 1978, pp. 127f, 
the additional inflation fed into the system through the 
depreciation, may give rise to a further devaluation of 
the domestic currency. This process may be seen to be of 
considerable duration, i_f more and more residents start to 
"speculate against their currency".
8. T.D. WILLETT (1979, p. 247), however, presents another expla­
nation for the continuation of the vicious circle: ".... if 
destabilizing speculation drove the exchange value of a curr­
ency below its equilibrium level, this would worsen the short- 
run inflation-output trade-off facing financial authorities 
and could induce additional monetary and fiscal expansion.
In such an instance, overdepreciation of the exchange rate,
operating on a government reaction function, could create•higher rates of inflation, which might legitimately be termed 
a vicious circle." This argument is based on the assumption 
that the government's intention is to make use of the short­
term trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In addi­
tion the government must be willing to accept a rate of 
inflation, higher than foreseen initially, in exchange for 
some reduction of the unemployment rate.
9. Furthermore, it must be noted that the destabilizing specu­
lation argument can also be formulated to explain a virtu­
ous circle. Speculation then induces a larger appre­




























































































the reduction in money supply growth relative to for­
eign countries. This, in turn, results in a reduction 
of or lower increase of import prices, thereby reduc­
ing the increase in the domestic price index. Again, 
this process may be of considerable duration, if due 
to portfolio shifts, the fact of the appreciation it­
self increases the demand for this currency.
1Q. The argument is easily extended in order to take ex­
plicitly into account expectations about the future 
behaviour of government and the central bank. See 
e.g, the BIS, annual report, 1976, pp. 31f: "To put
the matter another way, forceful action to combat in­
flation may be expected to have not only direct ef­
fects on domestic prices and wages but also an indi­
rect effect via the exchange rate. The policy actions 
themselves, together with the expectations they engen­
der, tend to strengthen the rate by more than is war­
ranted on immediate purchasing power parity grounds.
In this way, by lowering import costs and holding down 
export profits, exchange appreciation reinforces the 
direct effects of anti-inflationary policies and helps 
to make them self-fulfilling. Whenever, on the other 
band, domestic inflation leads to exchange deprecia­
tion, this will tend to feed inflation^-and such a 
’vicious circle’ can then be broken only through dras­
tic policy action." This argument provides an expla­
nation for tbe destabilizing effect of speculation, 
which, is interpreted here as reflecting the specula­




























































































11. The above argument can be strengthened by another ele­
ment. In the words of T.D. WILLETT (1979, pp. 254f): 
" . . .  when a country has been suffering from serious 
inflationary pressures, the market reacts not just to 
past inflation but also to expected future inflation 
rates. But there are lags in the effects of macro 
economic policies on the economy. Thus even when a 
sound stabilizing policy is implemented, it will take 
a good while for its real effects to show up. In the 
meanwhile speculation will have caused an exaggerated 
depreciation of the exchange rate, forcing up import 
prices and causing further inflation and undermining 
the initial stabilization policy. In other words, in 
such a situation the stabilization policy is not given 
the time to take hold." This- argument can itself ex~ 
plain the occurrence of a vicious- circle, if it is as­
sumed that the stabilization effort is given up in the 
end, e.g. because its- negative effects in terms of an 
increase of the unemployment is felt immediately, 
while the impact on the inflation rate does not appear 
due to speculation governed by such expectations. If 
the government pursues its stabilization with enough 
effort, however, this argument is reduced to explain­
ing temporary overshooting of the exchange rate.
1 2 . Overshooting has also been mentioned as an explanation
of vicious and virtuous circles. See for example the 
BXS annual report, 1977, p, 132: ". . . there is a
danger of unmanaged floating leading to an exchange 
level which clears the market on the basis of asset 




























































































point of view of the basic balance of payments.
. . . such overshooting, when it involves a large ex­
change rate movement, can itself be an independent 
source of current-account payments imbalances and of 
differences between countries' inflation rates since 
its price effects will typically be felt, via the 
changing cost of imports, more rapidly than its real 
effects on the basic balance of payments. In other 
words, overshooting can set in motion 'vicious1 and 
'virtuous' circles of exchange rate and price move­
ments. "--A similar statement is found in T.D. WILLETT 
(1979, p. 247), who refers to the theoretical discus­
sion about overshooting; " . . .  the impression is 
sometimes given that if one adopts a monetary or as­
set market approach to exchange-rate determination 
and assumes that asset markets adjust faster than 
goods markets, one is likely to have overshooting of 
exchange rates and the preconditions for a vicious 
circle as 3 frequent occurrence."
13. As the. first part of the destabilizing speculation
argument, overshooting only represents a precondition 
for the emergence of additional inflation compared 
with that level of inflation which would occur if the 
exchange rate followed the purchasing power parity 
path. B.ut while it can be argued that destabilizing 
speculation may itself be self-reinforcing, as was. 
done above, the adjustments of asset and goods mar­
kets will tend towards, a new equilibrium. Thus, no 
cumulative process can be involved in the overshoot­




























































































ernment action due to the worsened short-run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment is added.
14. This points to the basic difference between the desta­
bilizing speculation argument and the overshooting ar­
gument. The latter is based on an equilibrium concept, 
while the former need not include such a concept.
Thus, the overshooting argument considers the vicious 
or virtuous circle as a process which, moves towards a 
near equilibrium, while the destabilizing speculation 
can be considered as driving prices and exchange rates 
always further away from an initial equilibrium.
15. So far, these explanations in the recent debate of vi­
cious and virtuous circles, which are fundamentally 
based on the impact of asset markets on the determina­
tion of exchange rates, have been mentioned. As was 
already noted, the aspect of the worsening of the 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
can but need not be linked with this line of reasoning. 
This argument was particularly developed by R,
DORNBUSCH: and P. KRUGMAN (1976, pp. 572f) ; "The argu­
ment for monetary policy is that the Phillips curve is. 
flat, that wage pressure is slow to build up to an ex­
pansion in aggregate demand, and that, accordingly 
there is an advantageous trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment in the short run . . . .  But an at­
tempt to expand the economy through monetary policy in 
this manner will immediately cause the exchange rate to 
fall (or to fall faster), thus raising domestic prices 




























































































prices to rise at a higher rate." This implies a new 
and steeper Phillips curve which "embodies the infla­
tion arising from domestic wage pressure and from the 
impact of depreciation on import prices. It thus rep­
resents inflation of market prices rather than value- 
added prices" (p. 573). Thus, whereas in a regime of 
fixed exchange rates the flatter value-added prices 
Phillips curve would be relevant, with flexible ex­
change rates it is the steeper market prices Phillips 
curve which, matters. If, then, the government wishes 
to reduce unemployment by any given amount, a higher 
rate of inflation results in the case of flexible ex^ 
change rates. But normally, the choice by the govern­
ment of a new "equilibrium trader-off" between infla­
tion and unemployment for the new- and steeper Phillips 
curve will be a point of higher inflation as well as 
higher unemployment.
16. Again, this argument of a steepening of the Phillips
curve is not sufficient to explain the occurrence of a, 
vicious circle. It might rather be interpreted as 
frustrating governments from using the short-run in­
flation-unemployment trade-off at all. A vicious cir­
cle is only produced if one assumes in addition that 
the government continually tries to make use of this 
trade-off. But then the vicious circle would also re­
sult in the case of the flatter curve. However, the 
process- becomes more rapid with, the steeper curve. 
Furthermore, if the curvature is properly affected, 
some target level of unemployment might be accompanied 



























































































change rates and with nearly "infinite" inflation in 
the case of flexible exchange rates. Thus in order to 
use the argument of a steepening of the Phillips curve 
for the explanation of a vicious circle, one has ei­
ther to assume continuous efforts of governments to 
make use of this trade-off, or a continuous steepening 
of the Phillips curve, while the government pursues an 
expansionary policy.--To be sure, if the Phillips 
curve has steepened once only and the government tries 
to make use of the trade-off between inflation and un­
employment only once, the resulting monetary expansion 
causes also a further depreciation of the exchange 
rate, which again feeds in some additional inflation. 
In a limited sense, this may als-o be labeled a vicious 
circle, Eowe.ver, a new equilibrium will be reached. 
Therefore, no cumulative and continuously ongoing 
process is set in motion.
Furthermore f some explanations, of vicious circles re­
fer to a self-reinforcing inflationary spiral as a 
main element of the circle. For example, G, HABERLER 
(1 977, p. 1Q) states: "It is true that every long
drawn-out inflation develops vicious circle properties 
and is apt to 'set in motion a cumulative process' as 
the Governor of the Banque de France said in Manila. 
Inflation 'feeds on itself', because people will try 
to reduce their cash, balances by spending money faster 
on commodities and foreign money. In other words-, in­
flation tends to raise the velocity of circulation of 
money and it cannot be excluded that on some occasions, 



























































































Of course, this argumentrun equilibrium position." 
implies that the inflationary spiral only continues to 
work as long as the velocity of circulation of money 
increases. Since this cannot go on forever, no truly 
cumulative process can occur. Instead, some equilib­
rium will be reached, once the velocity of circulation 
of money stabilizes. Before this is the case, howev­
er, some kind of vicious circle can be said to be at 
work.--Furthermore, the r61e which exchange rate move­
ments play within this line of argument is not wholly 
clear. The initial inflationary push may be due to 
domestic sources and exchange rates may only passively 
adapt to the inflation differentials. Or the exchange 
rate movements, due e.g. to destabilizing speculation 
or overshooting, may themselves reinforce the infla­
tionary spiral. However, this latter aspect is not a 
necessary ingredient for this explanation of a vicious, 
circle.
The same holds true for the explanation of an infla­
tionary spiral referred to by H. LEHMENT (1980, p.
97). Starting with an initial depreciation of the do­
mestic currency, the resulting price increase may have 
the effect that expectations of future price increases 
are built, That is, the expected future rate of in­
flation is- corrected in the upward direction. As a 
consequence, the demand for money may fall, resulting 
in a further depreciation of the domestic currency.
If this depreciation exceeds in its amount the initial 
one, inflationary expectations rise again, followed by 




























































































other depreciation, etc. Theoretical models, which 
formalize this scenario of an "explosion" of exchange 
rates and inflation rates, have been developed for ex­
ample by D .A. PEEL (1978).— This explanation of the 
inflation spiral is very similar to the one presented 
by G. HABERLER. In both versions the assumption of a 
continuous increase in the velocity of circulation of 
money is made. The main difference between these ver­
sions is that H. LEHMENT and D.A. PEEL explicitly 
build on the role of expectations in this inflationary 
spiral.
19. Several authors (e.g. E. -M. CLAASSEN, 1 976., pp. 356ff; 
A.D. CROCKETT and M. GOLDSTEIN, 1976, pp. 523ff; P. 
LEWIS, 1976; and G. HABERLER, 1977, p, 9) refer to a 
so-called ratchet effect in order to explain higher 
rates of inflation under flexible exchange rates rela­
tive to the case of fixed exchange rates. T.D,
WILLETT (1979, p. 253) presents- this argument as an 
explanation for the occurrence of vicious circles:
. the so-called ratchet effect associated with 
a,symmetrical upward and downward flexibility of wages 
and prices: when an exchange rate falls, prices and
wages, rise, but when an exchange rate rises, wages and 
prices do not fall or do not fall as much. Thus ex­
change rate movements are said to ratchet up wages and 
prices'." Apparently, if exchange rates only adapt 
passively to inflation differentials, no vicious, cir­
cle can occur according to this argument. Thus, the 



























































































lizing speculation or overshooting. In this latter 
case a cumulative circle may appear: overshooting of
the exchange rate has the effect of ratcheting up wag­
es and prices above the equilibrium level (in terms of 
purchasing power parity). This induces an additional 
depreciation, again overshooting, etc.
A.D. CROCKETT and M. GOLDSTEIN (1976, pp. 524ff) pre­
sent and discuss three different explanations of the 
ratchet effect: a) the line of reasoning attributed
to LAFFER and MUNDELL, b) the argument of downward ri­
gidities within national economies and c) the SCHULTZS 
ratchet effect generated by demand shifts. LAFFER
and MUNDELL are said by these authors (p. 524) to "as­
sume that it will be the price level in the devaluing 
country that bears the full burden of the adjustment, 
and that producers in devaluing countries will quickly 
raise their prices to the full extent of the devalua­
tion". But since this argument excludes overshooting, 
no vicious circle can be explained by it. With regard 
to the second type of ratchet effect, A,.D. CROCKETT 
and M. GOLDSTEIN (1976, p. 525) state: "One reason
why changes in import prices might have an asymmetri­
cal effect on final product changes is that there are 
costs- to changing prices in imperfectly competitive 
markets, and that firms will change their prices only 
in response to those cost and demand changes that they 
view as permanent. To obtain the ratchet or asymmetry 
conclusion, it is then only necessary to assume that 



























































































porary than are positive changes." Clearly, this line 
of reasoning may well be combined with the overshoot­
ing argument and, thus, serve as an explanation for 
the vicious circle hypothesis, as is argued by T.D. 
WILLETT.''-The SCHULTZE demand shift explanation could 
also be used, because a depreciation induces a shift 
of demand towards domestically produced goods. Howev­
er, a S' R. DORNBUSCH and P. KRUGMAN (1 976, p. 570) 
point out, this effect may be expected to work with a 
considerable lag. Therefore, the direct impact of a 
devaluation on imported materials and import prices of 
finished goods will probably play- the major role in 
ratcheting up prices and wages.
Furthermore, the vicious and virtuous circles, hypothec 
sis has been explained by reference to the working of 
a wage-price spiral (see A.D, CROCKETT and M. 
GOLDSTEIN, p. 529, footnote 29; J,R. ARTUS and J.K. 
YOUNG, 1979, p, 664 and p. 687f; and H. LEBMENT, 198Q, 
p, 98). J,R. ARTUS and J.HT. YOUNG (1 979, p, 664) put 
the argument as follows: "Exchange rate changes may
thus- fail to have a lasting effect on the real wage 
rate, even if the initial impact is to moye it back to 
its equilibrium level. Labour resistance, at least in 
the case of a depreciation, may gradually move it back 
to its initial disequilibrium position,"— As H.
LEHMENT points out, a cumulative process of deprecia- 
tion/inflation can only occur if an expansionary mone­
tary policy accommodates these wage claims. If this 
condition is not met, the resulting increase of aggre­




























































































inflation and eventually further depreciation of the 
currency, but this process ends in a new equilibrium 
position. Thus, a vicious circle occurs only in a 
limited sense of the term.
22, Finally, it may be noted that several authors have 
combined several of the explanations of vicious and 
virtuous circles, spelled out above. For example, A. 
LAMFALUSSY (1979, p. 57) includes some elements of 
the wage-price spiral (wage indexation) and the over­
shooting argument in his "set of propositions that, 
put together, would tend to explain the self defeat­
ing nature of some currency depreciations". Similar­
ly, R, DORNBUSCH and P. KRUGMAN use the sensitiveness 
of wages to exchange rate changes as an additional 
aspect for the steepening of the Phillips curve. 
Furthermore, A.D. CROCKETT and M. GOLDSTEIN (1 976., p. 
529, footnote 29) combine the ratchet effect argument 
and the wage-price spiral aspect. The same is true 
for J!.A , ARTUS and J>.H, YOUNG (1979, p. 686).
THE VICTOUS/VIRTUOUS CIRCLE DEBATE IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
1, The relations between exchange rate dynamics and do­
mestic inflation haye been the object of great inter­
est in times even much earlier than the interwar pe­
riod, BRESCIANI-TURRONI noted that the discussions 
that tooh place in the twenties on this subject had 
an interesting similarity to those which had preceded 




























































































lier. By setting the clock even farther back, we can 
review the treatment of this relationship by two Ital­
ian economists, GEMINIANO MONTANARI, who lived in the 
17th century in Modena, and the ABBE' FERDINANDO
GALIANI, who spent his life in Paris and Naples.
1)Modena, the hometown of MONTANARI, was a small 
state, surrounded by other relatively little ones. 
Small wonder, therefore, that MONTANARI thought a 
change in the exchange rate would immediately be re­
flected in the internal price level. The degree of 
interdependence of the Modenese economy with, those of 
its neighbours was extremely high, and equally exposed 
to external influence was the Modenese monetary sys­
tem. A change in the exchange rate, brought about by 
the debasing of the local currency by the Prince, 
would, according to MONTANARI, mean that import prices 
would rise and, because of the high level of imports 
to GNP, the general price level would immediately rise 
as a result. But equally clear in the mind of 
MONTANARI was another cause of devaluation, the specu­
lative activities of merchants and financiers, who 
would take away money from the more productive trades 
to use it in speculation on the exchange markets,
These flows of funds from one centre to another, from 
one currency to another, could, in MONTANARI's opin­
ion, be the independent source of domestic inflation, 
in the manner examined above, so that from an initial 
overshooting of the exchange rate a vicious circle 
could ensue.



























































































large countries, like Naples and France, whose level of 
international interdependence was much lower, expressed 
much greater enthusiasm for an inflationary mechanism 
generated by a princely debasement. He was confident a 
very large part of the population would live under money 
illusion, and that the effect on the exchange rate of 
the debasement of one currency would be very quick (he 
called the exchange rate "the thermometer of States") 
but not very important on the internal price level, giv­
en the high level of self-sufficiency of the "Stati 
fruttiferi", and the non-essential nature of imports. 
Thus, the effect of a rise in import prices' would take 
time to work, itself through the system, and be of not 
much importance, anyway.
Inflation was, therefore, for GALIANT, an altogether 
fiscal phenomenon, which, could come about not through an 
increase in import prices or a fall in the exchange rate 
determined by speculation, but only as the result of a 
debasement of the currency operated by the Prince.
•
We have noticed the modern debate to revolve around two 
main subjects: the inherent instability, alleged by
some., of a floating exchange rate system, and the dan­
gerous effects on international equilibrium of the 
transfer of resources determined by the oil price in­
creases. A place in itself must be accorded to the 
vexata quaestio of the validating role of monetary poli­
cy, which contributes the fuel necessary for a vicious 
circle to work: itself off. The motivations of the in­
terwar debate are somewhat different: there is, for




























































































freely floating exchange rate system, nor, for that mat­
ter, a conscious indictment of the negative consequences 
of that system. The vicious circle hypothesis is intro­
duced by HELFFERICH and BORTKIEWICZ, and defended by
3)J.H. WILLIAMS, in order to establish the causes of the 
great German inflation of the early twenties, and to 
prove that the unchaining of the vicious circle leading 
from devaluation to inflation to further devaluation, 
was to be ascribed to the dynamics of the foreign ex­
change market, rather than to the dynamics of the German 
money supply motivated by the fiscal deficit of the Ger­
man State.
It is not difficult, if one wants to be cynical about 
the motivations of intellectual effort, to demonstrate a 
certain connection between the denial of the equitable­
ness or even only efficiency of German reparations and 
the vicious circle theory;, and a link between the needs 
of the main European creditor, Britain, and the theory 
according to which the origins of the German inflation 
were to be found in the fiscal irresponsibility of the • 
German Republic.
As will be shown in the remainder of this paper, howev­
er, the protagonists of the debate were too refined to 
present their views as crudely as I have done above. 
Their explanatory models had many more complications and 
qualifications, they gave a much more balanced image of 
the phenomenon of German inflation. Granted all this,>. Ihoweverf I would still maintain my crude stereotypes.




























































































onists the best internationally known economist and po­
lemicist of that time, J.M. KEYNES. In dealing with 
post-war problems of international monetary and real 
equilibrium, he seems to have little or no time for ei­
ther backing or disproving the vicious circle hypothe­
sis. Sis indictment of reparations was based, as is 
well known, on a magnification out of all proportions 
of the transfer problem. As often was the case with 
the man, he tried to settle an important political dis­
pute by resorting to economic analysis, and had to 
force some of his assumptions.
But, consistently with his view on reparations-, he was. 
of the opinion that the great German inflation was 
caused by the fiscal irresponsibility of the German 
government; indeed he dedicated many elegant pages of 
"A Tract on Monetary Reform" to the analysis of infla­
tion as an instrument of taxation.
Equally firm he seemed, in the same book, in his advo­
cacy of floating exchange rates; he did not advert to 
possible ^symmetries in adjustment which. could give 
rise to vicious circles. On the contrary, the quick­
ness of the mechanism leading from exchange rates move­
ments to internal price changes, and vice-versa, seemed 
to him a remedy to the alleged viscosity of prices in a 
fixed exchange rate system. Internal price management, 
which, he seemed to see as first priority, could be dis­
rupted by events occurring in the foreign exchange mar­
ket, but KEYNES advanced in the same volume the sugges­
tion that central banks could exercise a stabilizing 





























































































4. A very different, a much greater, interest the vicious 
circle hypothesis received by J.H. WILLIAMS. A life­
long critic of established and orthodox theories, 
WILLIAMS noticed in 1922, in an article published in the 
Q.J.E., that the fall in the external value of the Ger­
man currency, in 1921, far from stimulating exports and 
depressing imports, had been associated with the oppo­
site phenomenon. He ascribed the excess of imports over 
exports to the high, import content of German exports, 
which, prevented the falling Mark from boosting exports, 
as it boosted the costs of producing German exports; to 
export controls, to the depressed Russian market. But 
how had Germany managed to finance its import surplus? 
WILLIAMS thought that she had managed to do so partly by 
the sale of German currency to speculation-minded for­
eigners, who were thoroughly disappointed in their ex­
pectations about the future of the Mark. In part she 
had paid by German capital exports, in part by inward 
foreign investment in German industry, in part by bar­
ter. The German experience, noted WILLIAMS, threw in­
teresting light on the theory of foreign exchange under 
inconvertible paper. It bore out the view— he wrote—  
"that in a period of depreciating exchange, export and 
import prices rise first and in close sympathy with the 
exchange, whereas the rise in internal prices follows 
more slowly, the gap between the two providing a stimu­
lus to exports and a burden upon imports." It indicated 
unmistakably— he added— "also that the price changes 
follow the changes in the exchange rate". "It is equal­




























































































in note issue has followed the decline in exchange and 
the consequent rise of prices." "So far as the German 
case is concerned, it is evident"— he concluded— "that 
to demand restriction of inconvertible paper as the fun­
damental cure for depreciating exchange is to beg the 
question; the Reichsbank has not inflated for its own 
amusement. The same may be said of the view that the 
fundamental cure must be to 'balance the budget'; that 
budgetary deficits necessitate further note issue to 
cover the deficit, and that the increased issue causes 
further increase of prices and hence depreciation of ex­
change. "
To his mind, in 1921, the sequence of events in Germany 
was as follows: "The reparation payments by greatly in­
creasing the pressure of demand for foreign bills where­
with to make remittance, and also by impairing confi­
dence, drove down the value of the Mark in exchange. 
Import and export prices rose in sympathy with the ex­
change, and domestic prices followed upward more slowly. 
With prices rising, the state and private demands for 
credit were increased. To meet customers' demands for 
bank notes, bankers, holding their liquid assets mainly 
in Treasury Bills and only a minimum of the non-inter­
est-bearing Reichsbank notes, would present Treasury 
bills for encashment in bank notes, increasing the 
Reichsbank's holdings of Treasury bills and forcing in­
creased issues of bank notes in payment. At the same 
timef since the revenue of the Government is relatively 
fixed in the budget, whereas expenditures increase con­




























































































compels further issue of bank notes and Treasury bills." 
"If this analysis is correct,"— he concluded— "relief 
for Germany's financial and monetary difficulties must 
be sought in the reparations question and the foreign
trade, rather than in some point further down the chain
- „4)of consequences.
5. We come now to the real heart of the debate, the indi­
rect exchange that took place between K. HELFFERICH and 
C. BRESCIANI-TURRONI.
As far as the actual sequence of events is concerned, it 
was BRESCIANI-TURRONI who subjected the work of K, 
HELFFERICH to penetrating criticism. But it had been 
HELFFERICH to propound the anti-monetarist view of the 
German inflation and to lend his great academic authori­
ty to the vicious circle hypothesis. In trying to dis­
prove the hypothesis, BRESCIANI-TURRONI, though advanc­
ing his arguments in his usual balanced and careful man­
ner, was avowedly placing himself on the side of wha,t he 
himself called the "Inter-Ally view".
•
We shall quote extensively first from HELFFERICH and 
then from BRESCIANI-TURRONI, so that their respective 
views may emerge in full relief.
The following two quotations^ summarize the views of K. 
HELFFERICH with regard to the relationship between the 
devaluation of the German Mark and the increase in the 
circulation of paper money:
"In considering the monetary conditions in Germany, the 




























































































pure quantity theory, and accordingly regards the in­
crease in the circulation of paper currency in Germany 
as the cause of the rise in the level of German prices 
and of the depreciation of the currency. On closer ex­
amination, however, we find that cause and effect are 
here interchanged, and that the increase in the amount 
of paper money circulating in Germany is not in fact 
the cause but the result of the fall of the German ex­
changes and of the consequential rise in wages and 
„ 6 )prices.
"The chain of causes and effects is, therefore;
First came the depreciation of the German currency by 
the overburdening of Germany with international liabil­
ities and by the French policy of violence. Thence 
followed a rise in the prices of all imported commodi­
ties, This led to a general rise in prices and wages, 
which in turn led to a greater demand for currency by 
the public and by the financial authorities of the 
Reich; and finally, the greater calls upon the Reichs- 
ba,nk from the public and the financial administration 
of the Reich led to an increa.se in the note issue. In 
contrast, therefore, to the widely held view, it is not 
’inflation’ but the depreciation of the currency which 
is the first link in this chain of cause and effect. 
Inflation is not the cause of the rise in prices and of 
the depreciated currency, but the latter is the cause
of the higher prices and of the greater volume in the
- ,,7)issue of paper money.




























































































in the chain of causes and effects exposed by 
HELFFERICH. He was convinced that the extreme devalua­
tion of the German money was due to the "Reparation" 
obligations imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Ver­
sailles:
"In the above case, however, in which it has just been 
shown that the increase in paper remained far behind 
the currency depreciation, the causes of the collapse 
in the foreign exchanges, which are independent of the 
development of the paper circulation, are quite clear.
We are dealing with a country whose international in­
debtedness, quite apart from payments and deliveries 
due under the Treaty of Versailles, was passive to the 
extent of about 3 milliard gold marks, and the London 
Ultimatum added to the country's indebtedness an annual 
payment of "reparations" estimated at about 3.3 mil-' 
Hard gold marks. To this were added the payments im­
posed upon Germany for the ’clearing’ of pre-war debts 
and gold payments to the occupying Powers. The annual 
passive balance of the German balance of international * 
indebtedness was thereby increased to more than 7 mil­
liard gold marks. Anyone, then, who took the trouble 
to form a true estimate of the position could not doubt 
that the. attempt to fulfil these impossible obligations 
would necessarily result in a complete collapse of the 
German currency. On the occasion of the negotiations 
concerning the acceptance or rejection of the London 
Ultimatum, the author predicted, in agreement with the 




























































































Ultimatum and an attempt to observe its terms would lead
to an abysmal fall of the German currency (Sturz ins 
8Bodenslose)."
7. On page 575, HELFFERICH gives monthly data of the whole­
sale price index, differentiated between imported goods 
and home products, for the period from January 1920 un­
til March 1923. HELFFERICH concludes from this table:
"The most variable element in these columns is that of
tthe price of imported goods. Even when the rate for the 
dollar is not shown side by side with the prices of 
these, it is clear that they reflect the fluctuations of 
the German currency in terms of the money- of the world 
market, modified by movements in the gold prices of the 
world market. The prices of the domestic wholesale com­
modities follow haltingly and hesitatingly. When the 
dollar rate rises sharply, these prices remain at first 
strikingly behind the level of prices of imported com­
modities, yet, when the dollar rate and the prices of
imports begin to fall, they' continue the process of ap-
g)proximation by continuing to rise."
8. The above quotation does not explain the precise effect 
of the increase in the prices of imported goods on the 
prices of domestic commodities. Of course, since Germa­
ny imported raw materials, their increase affected di­
rectly the cost of production of finished and semi-fin­
ished domestic commodities. Furthermore, the price in­
creases of imported goods affected considerably the cost 




























































































to explain the continuous process of adaptation of the 
prices of domestic goods to the world market level even 
in periods of a falling dollar rate and reductions in 
the prices of imported goods, mentioned in the above 
quotation. K. HELFFERICH offers, very interestingly, 
the following explanation, which uses the concept of a 
wage-price spiral:
"The maintenance of the standard of living at nearly 
the level reached before the War presupposed a substan­
tial increase in the productivity of labour, haying re­
gard to the damage wrought to the processes of produc­
tion by the War and its result. But claims were put 
forward and effectively pressed to raise the standard 
of comfort and at the same time reduce the intensity of 
labour. This could have but one result^-a race between 
wages and prices such as we have witnessed in the last 
few years. The social and political position of labour 
was sufficiently strong to enforce higher wages not­
withstanding the fact that less work was done. As the 
profits of capital had shrunk to a minimum, the higher • 
wages could be paid only if higher prices could be ob­
tained for the products. But higher prices raised the 
cost of living and brought about fresh demands for
higher wages, which in turn led to a further rise in
J O )prices.
9. Finally, the effect of this wage^price spiral on the
demand for money of the German economy had to be shown, 
as well as- the role of the Reichsbank, when it was con­




























































































may serve this purpose, the first of which continues 
the above quotation:
"And what was the part played by money in this vicious 
circle? The race between wages and prices gave rise 
to a corresponding increase in the demand for money, 
both on the part of the people and on that of the fi­
nancial administration of the State. A monetary or­
ganisation which offered resistance to such an expan­
sion of the monetary demand would thereby have put a 
stop to the race between prices and wages. The acute 
shortage of money would have brought about a collapse 
of wages and prices, probably accompanied by crises 
and catastrophes. The German monetary system, howev­
er, makes possible in practice an unlimited expansion 
of the circulation, and it offered no such resistance. 
The monetary machine and its working, therefore, aided 
in the development pursued by wages and prices, but 
only in a secondary and passive manner. The increase 
in the issue of paper money is, within this complex of 
phenomena, not the cause but the consequence of rising, 
prices and wages. At the same time, the fact that it 
was possible for paper money to be issued in unlimited
quantities provided the necessary conditions for un-
11)limited increases in prices and wages."
10. The second quotation indicates the reason why the
Rei.chs.bank was not willing to stop the continued move­
ment of the. wage-price spiral:




























































































said that a monetary organisation which offered seri­
ous resistance to the unlimited expansion of the cir­
culation would necessarily have exercised certain re­
actions on the course of the level of prices and wag­
es, and also on the course of the foreign exchanges, 
which, owing to the relative ease with which the cir­
culation of German currency adjusts itself to the in­
creased monetary demand caused by currency deprecia­
tion and By the rise in the level of prices and wag­
es, have not occurred. But such reactions would have 
taken place, if at all, at the cost of uncontrollable 
crises and catastrophes; because if we were to follow 
the good advice given to us, and lay aside the note­
printing presses, whilst the factors which adversely 
affect the German currency continue to operate, we 
should be depriving German economic life of the media 
of circulation necessary and indispensable for trade,
'4for salary and wage payments, etc., so that in a very 
short time the local authorities and the State itself 
would be unable to pay their creditors, officials and 
workmen. Then, in a few weeks, not only the printing 
presses, But also the mines and factories, the rail­
ways and post-offices, and the State and communal ad­
ministration, in short, the entire communal and eco­
nomic life, would be at a standstill. The collapse 
of economic life, of the State, and of society would, 
however, do away with the insensate idea that the 
German nation is capable of meeting such tremendous 





























































































11. As we noted earlier, HELFFERICH's belief in the vicious 
circle hypothesis stemmed from his complete rejection 
of the Quantity Theory. It is useful to analyze this 
rejection in some detail.
According to HELFFERICH, the quantity theory establish­
es the following chain of causes and effects:
"If 'inflation' had been the cause, and the deprecia­
tion of the German exchanges the effect, then, in ac­
cordance with the theory of the classical English, econ­
omists, events would have developed on the following 
lines: an increase in the paper circulation causes, a
corresponding rise in the level of prices at home.
These higher prices encourage imports and make export 
more difficult. They tend, therefore, to mske the 
trade Balance,, and with it the balance of international 
indebtedness, unfavourable. When the latter balance is
passive, the demand for foreign currency' increases and
1 3 )the rates of foreign exchange are forced up."
K. HELFFERICH advances two empirical and one theoreti- 
csl argument against the explanation described above. 
The following quotations present first the empirical 
arguments.
For the period from May 1921 until January 1923, 
HELFFERICH: presents data from which he draws the fol­
lowing conclusions: "Thus in the twenty months which
followed the acceptance of the London Ultimatum the
1floating debt of Germany was multiplied 12— times, the 
note issue of the Reichsbank 23 times, the wholesale 




























































































ports 353 times, and the dollar rate 346 times. J4)
. .in fact, it is immediately obvious that in the 
case of Germany the increase in the note circulation 
did not precede the rise in prices, and also that the 
depreciation of the currency followed it but slowly 
and at some distance in time. The twenty-three-fold 
increase of the note circulation cannot possibly be 
the cause of the 10 times greater rise in prices at 
home and of the 15 times greater rise in prices of 
imports and of the dollar rate. A conception of the 
general and comprehensive outline of the interplay of 
causes in these developments can, in fact, be ob­
tained only if foreign exchange is made the starting 
point. "15)
The second empirical argument refers to the period 
from the end of January 1923 until March/April 1923.
"Even today, therefore, we have, as compared with the 
position in May 1921, a depreciation of the currency, 
measured by the standard of the dollar rate, and a 
diminution in the purchasing power of money at home, 
measured by wholesale prices, roughly five times the 
increase in the note circulation. That the note is­
sue went on increasing even during the fall of the 
dollar rate and its stabilisation, is due to the fact 
that the process of adjustment of the currency in 
circulation to the level of prices as conditioned by 
the position of foreign exchanges had not been com­
pleted. "-1 6}




























































































theoretical argument against the quantity theory:
"For the following, if for no other reason, the col­
lapse of the German exchanges will be seen to be in 
no way related to the increase of the note circula­
tion, At a .dollar rate of 21 ,546, the rate quoted on 
the 25th. January 1 923, a gold mark was worth, about 
50QQ paper marks. The note circulation of the 
Reichsbank, which at that time amounted to 1654 mil­
liard paper marks, thus represented a value of only
330 million gold marks. This is not much, more than 
1— th of the gold value of the German currency circu­
lating before the outbreak of war. It is, of course, 
true that the War and the Peace conditions restricted 
the economic activity of Germany, and thereby also 
the money turnover, and, further, that the rise in 
home prices was considerably less than the rise in 
the rates of the gold exchanges at the end of January 
1923; nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the
economic requirements of Germany could not possibly
1have been met by a circulation of — th of its pre-war .2Q
gold value, and that, therefore, the increase in the 
circulation could not have kept step, even approxi­
mately, with the depreciation of German money. This 
also explains why the catastrophic collapse of the 
mark, which began towards the middle of 1922, was, 
notwithstanding the avalanche of notes, accompanied 
by an acute shortage of money, which led to unprece­
dented rises in the rates of interest charged by the
Reichsbank, and the still greater rises in the rates




























































































12. "Opposed to the German theories were those which can 
be called the 'English' (because vigorously upheld by 
the representatives of Great Britain in the Repara­
tions Commission and in the Guarantees Committee) ac­
cording to which the fundamental cause of the depreci­
ation of the mark was the Budget deficit, which pro­
voked continued issues of paper money. I hold this 
second theory to be essentially correct, although it 
is necessary to recognize that in the last stages of 
the depreciation of the mark the relations between the
Budget deficit, the quantity of paper money, prices
18)and the exchange became more complicated . , . ."
Thus BRESCIANI-TURRONI, as we advanced earlier, stated 
his- choice of camp. He then proceeded to a detailed 
rebuttal of HELFFERICH's views.
HELFFERICH had maintained, as is shown above, that the 
depreciation of the Mark increased the demand for mon­
ey in a two^fold manner: a,) it aggravated, by dis­
turbing the national finances, the Budget deficit of 
the Reich, and b) it raised the transactions demand 
for money due to its effects on prices and wa,ges.
With, regard to the first issue, BRESCIANI-TURRONI uses 
an empirical approach: "Let us examine, in the light
of the facts, the theory according to which the budget
deficit was not the fundamental cause but the effect
1 9)of the depreciation of the mark." "During the war,
the depreciation of the mark was the consequence of 
the policy of financing the. expenditure of the Reich 
by haying recourse on a very large scale to the cen­




























































































ciated on the whole slowly during the war years. Dur­
ing the whole of that period monetary and financial 
phenomena developed according to the classical scheme. 
Budget deficit, increase of issues, increase of inter­
nal prices, i.e. diminution of the purchasing power of 
the paper money: a diminution which necessarily exer­
cised a depressing influence on the exchange. I have 
already noted in Chapter I that from 1914 to October
1918, internal prices increased less than the quantity
- . ^ „ „20)of money existing xn Germany.
"In the summer of 1922 there appeared for the first 
time a distinct reaction of the depreciation of the 
mark on the Reich Budget,, in the sense that the defi­
cit was aggravated. While in the preceding months the 
German Government had succeeded in making some prog­
ress towards the balancing of expenditure and income, 
after July 1922, the depreciation of the mark again 
profoundly disturbed the state of the national fina,nc~ 
es. The. real yield of the receipts lessened rapidly 
. . . . On the other hand, expenditure was maintained, 
at a high, level. The depreciation of the mark, which 
originally had been the consequence of the dislocation 
of the national finances, now contributed very much to
the aggravation of the disorder and progressive disin- 
21 )tegration.
"In the December issue of Wirtschaft und Statistik, 
1923, some interesting calculations were published of 
the. amount in gold of the yield from taxes and of the 




























































































the discount of Treasury bills. For the period from 
1914 to October 1923, the total results are as follows: 
taxes, 21.2 milliards; loans, 52.6 milliards; Treasury 
bills, 59.1 milliards. These statistics clearly dis­
play the financial policy followed by the German Gov­
ernment for ten years, which resulted in scarcely 15
per cent of the expenses being covered by means of tax-
, ,22 )es.
13, Depreciation and the balance of payments
According to K. HELFFERICH, the deficit of the balance 
of payments, considerably aggravated by the reparations 
payments, is the reason for the depreciation of the 
Mark.. To this C, BRESCIANI-TURRONI objects:
"The principal point on which one must insist is this: 
In a great country like Germany, endowed with vast re­
sources and with a great variety of imports and exports 
r-on which variety was based, even during the war, a 
considerable elasticity of foreign demand for German 
products, and of German demand for foreign goods--a de1* 
preciation of the exchanges, when it is provoked only 
by an increase in the demand for foreign goods, cannot 
go beyond a certain limit (let us say, 15, 2Q or 30 per 
cent of parity) because compensatory forces which the 
depreciation raises, prevent it from passing beyond 
this limit. Although the increase in the demand for 
foreign goods may be the cause of an initial deprecia­
tion of the market exchange, it cannot explain the con­
tinual depreciation. To explain the continual depreci­




























































































that the real demand curve for foreign goods was moved
continually towards the right (. . .). But this is
scarcely possible; besides, the reactions which would
arrest the depreciation of the exchange would quickly 
,,23)appear.
This objection refers to the trade balance, only.
However, BRE SCIANI-TURRONI takes also into account an
"abnormal demand" for foreign exchange, due to the
habit of German industrialists of leaving abroad a
part of the profits from exports, due to a "flight of
capital", due to the Mark ceasing to be wanted as a
24)"store of value", etc. "Renee, under conditions of
the depreciation of the circulating medium, the for­
eign exchange market presented an altogether extraor­
dinary appearance. When the currency is stable the 
demand for foreign exchange is determined by the ne­
cessity of making payments abroad. But in Germany, to 
this normal demand was added an entirely abnormal de­
mand, which was principally provoked by the desire to 
invest savings securely in foreign exchange.
>!However, concerning this abnormal demand, C. 
BRESGI^NI-TURRONT raises the same objection against 
its use as an explanation for the continual deprecia­
tion of the Mark as in the case of the deficit of the 
trade balance; "There is no doubt that the abnormal 
demand for foreign exchange on the part of the German 
public who determined to take part in the flight of 
capital must cause a depreciation of the exchange.




























































































tain limits if the quantity of marks had not been in­
creased. In fact, the increase in the prices of for­
eign currencies had immediate effect on the prices of 
imported goods, and that— had the money income of con­
sumers remained stable— would have meant that prices 
which passed a certain limit would quickly become pro­
hibitive, It was only due to the rise in money in­
comes, which was the consequence of the increase in 
the circulation, that it was possible that imported
goods, which were sold at rising prices because of the
2 6 )depreciation of the exchange, could find buyers."
"Hence, in order that the abnormal demand for foreign 
exchange for hoarding should exercise a detrimental 
influence for a long time on the national paper money 
(a,s happened in Germany) , it is necessary that this 
demand should be fed, continually, by new- issues of 
paper money, which also cause distrust to spread con­
tinually."275
BRES CI AN I - TURRONI continues his analysis, by consider- 
ing the effects of the Reparation payments on the de­
valuation of the Mark. He recognizes: "It was not
possible for exports to develop so rapidly a,s to ex­
ceed imports by several milliards and to create the 
source from which the German Government normally had
to draw the foreign exchange necessary for reparative
 ̂ ,,28) payments.
Although, according to BRESCIANI-TURRONI, the sums ac­
tually paid under the Treaty of Versailles and the Ul­




























































































be significantly responsible for the continual depre-
29)ciation of the Mark, this author recognizes a psy­
chological influence of these events: "I willingly
admit that the Treaty of Versailles created psycholog­
ical influences unfavourable to the mark. But, in his 
study of the consequences of the payments made in 
1921, Elster neglected the fundamental question: why
were those consequences so serious? The answer is as 
follows;- the German Government bought foreign ex­
change with paper money which was not purchasing power 
collected from German citizens by taxes, but new pur- 
chasing power created by the discounting of Treasury 
bills at the Reichsbank, that is, by the increase of 
note-issues. If, on the other hand, the quantity of 
paper money had not been increased, the depreciation 
of the mark, caused by the payment of reparations, 
would not have gone beyond a certain limit, which it 
is reasonable to suppose would have been quickly 
reached— given the reactions which would have shown 
themselves in an elastic demand for foreign exchange 
and in the exports of goods and services, and, moreo­
ver, in the sale to foreigners of houses, shares, and 
other parts of the national wealth of Germany. Hence, 
a more energetic financial policy would at least have 
lessened the effects of reparation payments on the 
German exchange.
BRESCIANI-TURRONI considers furthermore the effect of 
speculation on the depreciation of the German Mark and 
also the interest of German industrialists in the con­




























































































"But although the origin of the depreciation of the 
German mark cannot certainly be traced to the manoeu­
vres of speculation, it appears possible to state 
that at a certain stage of the depreciation of that 
currency, speculation played an important role.
. . , For some time, it was foreign speculation
(foreigners possessed large sums of marks) which pro­
voked the great fluctuations of the exchange. In 
February 1920, the mark had fallen to 4 per cent of 
its gold parity; in May of the same year it rose 
again to 1 2 per cent; and that was mainly' due to for­
eign speculation. Later the speculation of Germans
31 )assumed greater importance."
"The theorists also maintain that speculation cannot 
exercise an influence which, manifests itself con­
stantly in the same direction . . . .  Without doubt 
this argument is valid for an early phase of the de­
preciation of the paper mark, when there was no inti­
mate connection between the exchange rate and domes­
tic prices. But in a later phase, when the deprecia- • 
tion of the exchange had immediate effect on prices, 
the consequences of the operations of speculators 
were more serious and lasting. In fact, the rise in 
prices, as we have seen above, was a potent stimulus 
to the increase of the inflation, as the Government 
and the Central Bank had not sufficient strength to 
oppose the demands of business men. Hence, the new 
level of the exchange, provoked by speculators, tend­
ed to be justified By internal developments. Subse­




























































































market foreign exchange earlier acquired by them, could 
not depress the exchange rate to its former level, be­
cause the foreign exchange was bought with the aid of 
the new issues of paper money, and a new equilibrium of
the exchange was established corresponding to the new
32)level of internal prices."
"But it is certain that a financial and banking policy
which did not regard the increase of note-tissues as an
inevitable consequence of the rise in internal prices,
would Have been able to arrest the effects of specula^
33)tion on the fall of the mark."
With regard to the interest of German industrialists in 
the depreciation of the mark, BRESCIANI-TURRQNI states; 
"The example of all countries, with a depreciated cur-' 
rency shows us that the depreciation of money creates a 
vast net of interests vested in the maintenance and 
continuation of the depreciation itself, interests 
which are disturbed by the possibility of a stabilizes 
tion of the exchange and which, therefore, are assidu­
ously opposed to the return of normal monetary condi­
tions. "34)
"While sale prices rapidly approached world prices the 
industrialists: paid wages which, for a long time, in­
creased only at a great distance behind the rise in 
sale prices;, other elements in the cost of production, 
such as transport expenses, declined in importance.
The fiscal burden was continually lightened, and in ad­
dition the payment of certain taxes, which industry had 




























































































became for the entrepreneur a source of conspicuous 
excess-profits. Mortgage debts were rapidly can­
celled, bank credits, cleverly used, made possible the 
acquisition of foreign exchange, freehold property, 
etc,; and the difference between internal and external
prices was a source of considerable gains for export- 
,,35)ers.
14, Depreciation and domestic prices
BRESCIANI-TURRONI distinguishes three phases of the 
German inflation with a different relationship between 
the external and the internal value of the mark;
"On the whole , it may be said that during the war pe-̂
riod, save for temporary fluctuations, there was not
much difference between the exchange rate of the mark.
and the 'price parities'; whilst in the following
years, . , . the divergence was- much greater. In the
years 1914-18, the value of the gold mark in paper
marks increased less than the level of German prices
(...). A plausible explanation of this is the fact •
that, in that period, prices in terms of gold rose in
3 6)foreign markets,"
After the Armistice, a new phase in the evolution of 
the mark, began. The external value of the German cur­
rency fell well below its internal value and remained
37)lower until September 1923.
"Every depreciation of the exchange tended to lessen 
the external value and to increase the divergence be^ 




























































































time the increase in the disparity between the two val­
ues provoked a reaction. The reaction consisted, not 
in an improvement of the exchange, and hence in an ap­
proach of the external to the internal value of the 
mark, but, because of the continual note issues, in a 
rise in the internal price-level, that is, in a fall of 
the internal value of German money. These facts lead 
to the conclusion that in the period under discussion 
the new incessant issues of paper money acted first on 
the exchanges and afterwards on internal prices, wheth­
er as a result of speculation or because some of the 
new money wa,s employed directly by the German Govern­
ment to purchase foreign exchange. Later the money 
came into the internal circulation, provoking a rise in 
the prices of goods; but at the same time new issues of 
paper money,, which went directly into the foreign ex­
change market, caused a new depreciation of the ex­
change."381
"Later, the adaptation of home prices to the exchange, 
rate tended to become automatic, that is, the paper 
prices were the result of two factors;, the base prices 
and the ’multiplier', the 'index' which varied in more 
or less strict relation to exchange rates . . . .  But 
though the equalization of the internal and external 
yalues of the mqrk was not reached before the summer of 
1923, the tendency to adaptation was always present, 
and was a, force which, for four years, kept in a con­
tinual state of agitation prices of goods, security
prices-, wages, salaries-, railways rates, and the rates




























































































"As a result of the return to peace-time, gold prices 
as the basic price and of the adaptation of present 
prices to the future exchange rate, in a more advanced 
stage of the monetary depreciation, the rise of inter­
nal prices was more rapid than the rise of foreign ex­
change rates. 'The principal characteristic of the 
last phase of the monetary depreciation in Germany,1 
writes Kuczynski, 'was the rise of internal prices, 
which from 6Q per cent, round about the world level, 
as they were at the end of 1922, rose at least to 110 
per cent of the world level towards the autumn of 
1 923. ’ ,,40)
"Let us formulate our conclusion. In an early phase, 
the external value of the mark was dominated mainly, 
in its general movement, by the fall of the purchasing 
power of the mark in the home market. In a later 
phase, the movements of the internal value and of the 
external purchasing power of the German mark appeared 
determined mainly by the exchange rate of the dollar 
expressed in paper marks. The exchange rate of the 
dollar varied primarily under the action of causes 
which_directly influenced it; these variations pro­
voked corresponding movements in the internal purchas­
ing power, but the reaction was not, generally, immedi­
ate, hence the external value remained lower than the 
internal.
In an early phase of the depreciation, there existed a 
’system' of internal prices, the rigidity of which 
presented a great contrast to the very sharp varia­




























































































ter back towards equilibrium, despite the influence 
of causes directly affecting the exchange rate in 
causing a movement from equilibrium. Later this sys­
tem of internal prices was disorganized. On the one 
hand, was the lack of control first imposed by public 
authority; on the other, the influence of psychologi­
cal causes, which curbed the rise of prices, was con­
tinually weakened. Prices became more and more sensi­
tive to the variations of the exchange. Movements in 
the exchange rate caused an immediate movement in cer­
tain prices, the disturbance spreading slowly to oth-* 
er prices,*, but this process of diffusion became more 
rapid as the situation developed. A ’system' of in­
ternal prices', which represented a kind of centre of 
gravity of the oscillations of the exchange and which 
determined the ’equilibrium price’ of the latter (the 
current market price representing only an ephemeral 
movement), no longer existed. Internal prices became 
unstable and, together with wages and salaries, they 
became subject to every breath in the exchange mar- 
ket," ;
However, st the theoretical level, BRESCIANI-TURRQNI 
maintains; " . . .  if money incomes had not increased 
owing to an increase in the quantity of money in cir­
culation, to the rise in the demand for foreign ex­
change provoked by sn intenser need for foreign goods, 
or by making foreign payments resulting from ’non-mer­
chandise transactions’, there must correspond a less­
er demand for home-produced goods. Those who pro­




























































































tion and dismiss workmen; hence, the fall in the demand 
for goods tends to be accentuated. On the other hand, 
exporters invest their profits in extending the produc­
tion of goods for export, and their demand for labour 
increases. In the last analysis, the prices of goods 
for internal consumption tend to be maintained at the 
former level, and the depreciation of the exchange rate 
only has a permanent influence on prices of imported 
goods, and a temporary influence on those of exported 
goods. Therefore, internal prices can only be dis­
placed under the pressure of the depreciation of the
exchange in so far as there is a continual issue of pa- 
,,42)per money.
15, Refutation of HELFFERICH1 s "gold value argument"
As the quotations given above demonstrate, ERESCIANI- 
TURRONI attempted to show that, contrary to the theory 
expounded by HELFFERICH, it was the increase of note- 
issuing and not the depreciation of the Mark, which, 
caused the continuation of the German inflation. How-
F «1 .................................................. ......... •
ever, he agreed with HELFFERICH to the extent that a, 
change in the monetary policy would result in a stabi­
lization crisis, to which BRESCIANI-TURRONI devoted a 
whole chapter of his book (chapter 10), although he 
considered such, a crisis to be less severe than 
HELFFERICH;. Thus, it remains to quote the position of 
BRESCIANI-TUR,RONI with respect to the "gold value argu­
ment", represented in section 1.2,, paragraph 1Q.
"Whilst in Germany itself economists and financiers 




























































































of the circulating money the proof of the non-existence 
of the 'so-called inflation', outside Germany the sci­
entific explanation of the phenomenon was given. I re­
fer to a famous article by Keynes in which he shows 
that in an advanced phase of monetary inflation new 
note-issues are accompanied by an increase in the ve­
locity of' the circulation of the currency, and that the 
influence exercised by the velocity of circulation on
prices and the exchange can be greater than that of
„43)successive issues of paper money.
"During the war and also after the Armis.tice, paper 
money was extensively hoarded especially in the coun­
try. Calculations, of whose accuracy it is difficult 
to be certain, conclude that the nominal value of notes 
withdrawn from circulation at the end of 192Q had risen 
to 1Q milliard paper marks, that is to about one-sev­
enth of the total issues. In addition, a considerable 
quantity of marks had found their way abroad . . . .  
Later, when the continual depreciation of the German 
currency undermined the confidence of even the most ob»- 
stinate speculators for a rise in the mark, the hidden 
marks flowed into the market, both from the interior of 
Germany and from abroad, intensifying the rise of pric­
es . . .  . In the summer of 1923, when the mark was 
losing value day by day-— even between morning and af­
ternoon— -everyone tried to get rid of marks as soon as 
they were received. This increase in the velocity of 
the circulation was the expression of the fact that the





























































































"Examining the monetary events which occurred in Germa­
ny, we may, I believe, come to these conclusions: a)
in an early stage, which was the longest, monetary de­
preciation was mainly in proportion to the quantity of 
paper money; b) in the next period, that is from the 
summer of 1921 to the summer of 1922, the influence of 
the new note-issues was intensified by the increase of 
the velocity of circulation, by the return of marks 
sold abroad and by the efflux of marks from hoards; c) 
after the summer of 1922, a new influence was added to 
provoke a fall in the value of the monetary unit more 
than proportional to the increase in the quantity of 
paper money, for the place of the paper mark was taken 
by foreign exchange and by other means of payment 
. . . , Hence, in monetary conditions characterized by 
a great distrust in the national money the principle of
Gresham is reversed, and good money drives out the bad,
45)and the value of the latter continually depreciates."
"A rise in the velocity of the circulation of money 
capital tends-'-when it is not due simply- to an increase 
in the intermediary stages of production-'-to provoke a 
rise in wholesale, prices, which, tends to react on re­
tail prices. The real income of the working classes 
then falls^ and the workers demand a rise in money wag­
es. which either provokes new issues of paper money, or, 
if the quantity of paper money remains constant, can 
only be obtained by means of a rise in the income ve->
locity of money, that is by shortening the interval be-
46)tween the successive payments of wages."




























































































idly than the quantity of money because the velocity of 
the circulation increases. Instead, the relation ex­
isting between the phenomena in question is as follows 
(as explained by Marshall): the fraction of their in­
comes or wealth which individuals are, on the whole,
disposed to hold in the form of 'available money', di-
Iminishes, therefore the quantity —M increases; prices
a 47)rise, and money circulates more rapidly."
16. BRESCIANI-TURRONI on BORTKIEWICZ
According to BORTKIEWICZ, whose analysis may be consid- 
ered a refinement of the HELFFERICH theory, the in­
crease in the velocity of the circulation of money is a 
reaction to the scarcity of the circulating medium. 
Thus, "the increase in the velocity of circulation is 
not the cause which accelerates the monetary deprecia­
tion but the expression of an adjustment to the new ne­
cessities created by the rise in prices, which, in its 
turn, is the consequence of the continual depreciation 
of the exchanges.
•
"Numerous other authors, besides BORTKIEWTCZ, contend 
that the depreciation of the exchange provoked an in­
crease in the prices of goods, and that from that fol­
lowed a rise in the velocity of circulation of money, 
which was sufficient to support the new high level of 
prices. With the aid of this argument writers have 
sought to show- that the internal value of a paper cur­
rency is independent of monetary and banking policy and
is, on the contrary, dominated by the state of the bal-




























































































"In my opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the indirect and the direct effects of a depreciation 
of the exchange. Indirectly, the depreciation of the 
exchange, by creating the expectation of future rises 
in prices, and therefore inducing consumers and mer­
chants to hasten purchases, helps to provoke a rise in 
the velocity of the circulation of money. But, as. was 
said above, these effects are purely temporary if the 
exchange does not continue to depreciate. As for the 
dibect effects of the rise of prices, provoked by the 
depreciation of the exchange, on the velocity of the 
circulation of the money, it may be observed that un­
til the public has lost confidence in the money, the 
depreciation of the exchange, due to a disturbance in 
the balance of payments, only influences prices of im­
ported and exported goods. If the quantity of money 
does not vary, the profits of some classes of mer­
chants correspond to the losses of other classes. In 
every way, even if new incomes are created they are 
only a very small matter compared with, the mass of ex­
isting monetary incomes; and the influence on the in­
come velocity of the money and on general prices could 
only be very slight. The situation is different when, 
in an advanced phase of the inflation, a depreciation 
of the exchange reacts immediately, mainly for psycho­
logical reasons, also on the prices of goods of purely 
domestic character, and the rise of prices becomes 
general. Then the income velocity of money tends to 
increase as- a direct consequence of the depreciation 




























































































created to the advantage of producers--profits which
they invest in the purchase of goods— or because the
working classes and salary-earners whose real incomes
are lessened obtain the payment of wages and salaries
50)at shorter intervals."
Concluding Remarks.
In this paper 1 have tried to show hoŵ  dangerous the 
present trend in economics can be, which, consists of con- 
sidering only what was written in the latest issues of the 
professional journals as relevant to the current theoreti­
cal debate, and everything else as pertaining to the his­
tory of the discipline.
T have presented the reader with a series of quota­
tions, some from the contemporary, some from the interwar, 
debate on the vicious circle hypothesis. Can the honest 
reader really detect any improvement in the analytical 
content of the modern debate? Arguments and counterargu­
ments in the first debate overlap those of the modern de­
bate to an almost complete and embarrassing degree. I 
therefore think I can conclude with an exhortation to the 
members of my profession to lengthen their historical mem­
ory a bit more, and to be less certain the "scientific" 
method they have borrowed from other disciplines warrants 






























































































1, On Geminiano Montanari the best available work is a dis­
sertation written by Giovanni Ferri at the University of 
Siena; Mr. Ferri will shortly publish a journal article 
on the subj ect.
2, Ferdinando Galiani's "Della Moneta" has been translated 
into English by Peter Toscano as "On Money", now availa­
ble in University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1977, On the 
Abbe's work, the best reference is still, in English,, J. 
Schumpeter's "History of Economic Analysis".
3, The date of his article "German Foreign Trade and the 
Reparations Payments", Q.J.E,, 1922, would probably 
place Williams- as the earliest academic writer to have 
advanced the full "vicious circle hypothesis". However, 
this hypothesis, in less logically consistent forms, had 
been present in the German academic debate in the course 
of the First World War, On the subject, see J.W.
Ahgell, The Theory of International Prices-, Harvard,
1 925,
4, F.D, Graham, in his book on the German hyperinflation 
(Graham, 193Q), also seems to subscribe to this view; 
however, he does not seem to be aware of the arguments 
of J.H, Williams, K', Kelfferich and J, Angell; he quotes 
William1a article and Helfferich's book, but, in the 
text of his booh, where he deals with the "vicious cir~ 




























































































5. All the quotations that follow are taken from K,
Helfferich, Money, translated by L. Infield, reprint, 
New York, A. Kelley, 1969.
6. Money, p. 598.
7. Money, p. 601 .
8. Money, p. 600.
9. Money, p. 576.
10. Money, p. 
not link 
prices of
597. Note, however, that K. Helfferich 
this argument to the relationship between 
imported and domestic commodities.
11 . Money, p. 597-598.
12. Money, p. 603-604,
13, Money, p. 599.
14, Money, p. 598-599.
15. Money, p. 599.
16. Money, p. 602-6Q3.
17. Money, p. 599.
18. C. Bresciani-Turroni, Inflation, 1968, p. 46f.
19. Inflation , p. 47.



























































































21 . Inflation, P- 62.
22. Inflation, P* 74.
23. Inflation, P- 84.
24. Inflation, P- 88f.
25. Inflation, P* 90.
26. Inflation, P* 90.
27. Inflation, p. .92.
28. Inflation, p. 98.
29. See e.CT. Inflation
30. Inflation, p. 98.
31 . Inflation, P- 1 01 .
32, Inflation, P, 1 02.
33. Inflation, P- 1 Q3.
34. Inflation, P* 1 04,
35, Inflation, Pi 1 04f
36. Inflation, P- 130,
37, Inflation, Pi 131 .




























































































39. Inflation, P- 136.
40. Inflation, p. 1 43.
41 . Inflation, p. 1 43-4
42. Inflation, p. 1 45.
43. Inflation, p. 1 59.
44, Inflation, p. 1 66.
•LD Inflation, P* 174.
46. Inflation, P- 1 70.
47. Inflation, P- 181 .
00 Inflation, P- 1 76.
49. Inflation, P- 181 ,
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>' YaY;Y ■ a Tw  rY1" Ŷ Y-YY.-v V,. .- „  r  . .. -  r.V - a : „  .1 ■ 7 - . . P)A >  : \ : L  D J} • - xY + A F ,
I F 1 A'77 ” > .!•' • ■ '  V  ' ■ y -  7n W  A ' -  ■■ a . ' A >,■  ’ . ,-F" 7 '■ ,\ ' x  7 ’ '
y  . •■ ’ ■' ■ i M u  ■ ■ i . f a t  ■.
' -A _ 'Ax A ■ , -, 7-A  A'. ■• ■ ! il : A ‘Y  .' À Ì  / : ) , •  , , "■ y. Al *  : A ' ‘ A ,  V  A '  *   ,  A  '  ‘ V  <f\ <k
. -■ ’ 1  i y  ' :. M  .7: ' . .
, , A  k h  A ' A  Ì  - 7, .  ■ : .
fé  a . y  ;â -a -. ■. : . Y  k l i  ,«  n $ fì  % T  / sY ;Y ' . ><
V \  . -  ■..-'> . - ^  Yf ' ■’ 7 ■• Y  '\ .  ■ ^. , i 1 . ' ■ Y  ■ I - ... • w- . \ - 'b  n ' .Y "V ;•
' , 1  ■' Y  • ■ s • • Al. Y v ,  . Ï  ■ " l  ■ ' v ■ . A * .,. r ; ' •
\Y  .7- - Y  / -1,1 ( Y  - Y aaVv S'.:' 4>Yx'YY ;̂ } .■..- ' ■ ^  IY Y :
v aY Y S v  ̂y ^ '  î; "a ’: Y-.i ;y,A YYv ' ■ !>■. Y h\. Y a Y ; Y Y Y Y
SA’' ■ i  ' ' ' ■ ■ ' Y  . ) , a i  i Y Y,’ ÿk ì  '
iY>. >'V
\ -K/- ' ■’"'/■
■ ; A /  .r A , ® i . .,.’ .7
. ■ a  Ai : Yil YYY v YYY Ya,_ x . 4  a ” \. x ! • "a ■'F a.a.|’.a ;.y  y y r à k y  ;a ,v- -%
? r ,A ’ :; j Y : Y : Y , ' à A ' . ' ’ 7 V ; Y ; ''a Y : ^ A 7 ; ,  a  7?.7 a  a . ; Y  }  A
$  ' . Ï : % ' ’ ' " iti/
m  Y  Æ   ̂ ’ ■ • Yt. YYY- Y . . , ,  yy  jY 4 X\l Y ,
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
